

A-5 Contemporary Issues in International Conflict

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Volatile Breeding Grounds: The Origins of Terrorist Tactics in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Abstract:

Why do social movements resort to the use of terrorist tactics? Terrorist organizations often begin as social movements and later resort to using terrorist tactics to accomplish their goals. This case study concerning the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood identifies what occurred between the initial creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 and its first terrorist attack in 1938. Three causes when combined present an interesting story as to why the Brotherhood turned to terrorism. The first of these causes is (1) the charismatic leadership of Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood; the affect of al-Banna's charismatic leadership as defined by Max Weber on the Brotherhood cannot be underestimated. Al-Banna sanctified the use of violence if the Brotherhood did not accomplish their goals and his Brothers were completely obedient to him. (2) Frustration with a lack of Islamic reform in the Egyptian population and government lead to aggression, and terrorism become the modus operandi of the Muslim Brotherhood. Lastly, it is evident when terrorist tactics became the modus operandi of the Brotherhood because an internal leadership crisis ended in 1932. The moderates formed their own Islamic association and the extremists stayed within the Brotherhood, eventually creating the Secret Apparatus, which was the sect of the Brotherhood responsible for using terrorist tactics. (3) Those extremists whose violent personalities were inclined to use terrorist tactics ascended to positions of leadership within the Muslim Brotherhood.

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Where Do Third-Parties Intervene?

Abstract:

Why do third-party states militarily intervene in civil conflicts, even though it is quite difficult to terminate a civil conflict in a short period and thus a military intervention is very costly? While there is a vast literature examining the effectiveness of third-party interventions on civil conflicts, the factor influencing the probability of third-party intervention itself has been overlooked. I apply Bueno de Mesquita et al's (2003) selectorate theory in the context of civil conflicts and military interventions and provide answers for the question why and where third-party states intervene. By using the dataset of civil conflicts and military interventions from 1944 to 1999, I find that democratic third-party states are likely to intervene when the probability of successful intervention or victory is high and when they are ethnically tied to a conflict state, however, I find that there is no significant effect of those public goods on the autocratic third-party states' military intervention. I also find strong evidences that an existence of diamonds in conflict state increases the probability of military interventions by autocratic third-party states, but has no significant effect for democratic third-party states.

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Regime Types, War Participation, and Battle Deaths in the Twentieth Century

Abstract:

In this paper, I assess the effect of participation in wars by democracies and autocracies on the number of battle deaths. I assert that (a) democratic third parties have lower numbers of battle deaths than democratic initiators, while autocratic initiators have the highest war casualties, and (b) democratic countries sacrifice more than autocracies at war when they are attacked. I use a recently compiled battle death dataset (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005) in my analysis, and include variables measuring pre-war

population and army size, industrialization level, development, soldier equipment, war duration, and Cold War in a negative binomial regression model (NBRM). I present separate results for different time periods (pre/post-WWII) and for different types of war (interstate/extrastate; with or without two World Wars). I conclude with the suggestion that democratic third parties/allies would not commit as much resource for war as their autocratic counterparts due to institutional constraints.

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Bullies and Victims: Targets of Third Party Interventions in Ongoing Conflicts

Abstract:

Theories of war tell us that states contemplating to start a conflict choose their targets carefully and take into account the likelihood of third party interventions in their decision to begin hostilities. Yet, miscalculations seem to happen, as third parties often join ongoing conflicts. Theories of joining behavior tell us under what circumstances third parties are likely to intervene. However, such theories tell us little about which states third parties are likely to target in their interventions. I combine models of conflict initiation and models of joining behavior to address the question of which conflict originators are targeted by third party interventions. I use Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) data to test the hypotheses developed from such models. I find that hypotheses concerning balance of power behavior are commonly violated. Third parties show a marked tendency toward status quo preservation by "ganging up" against revisionist and authoritarian states, regardless of whether they were the aggressors in a conflict.

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MIDs as Bargaining Leverage: When Territorial Disputes Become Militarized

Abstract:

States involved in territorial disputes are more likely to initiate a militarized interstate dispute (MID) than states involved in other types of disputes. Theories of bargaining and research on territorial disputes indicate that a state will initiate a MID in order to demonstrate resolve about the disputed claim and a MID is more likely when the disputed territory has strategic value or ethnic value. Though useful, these factors are static and do not vary over time, so they cannot explain the timing of a MID in a territorial dispute. It is not clear why a challenger state would be more resolved regarding a territorial claim at one point, but not another. This paper seeks to address the puzzle of *when* MIDs occur. I hypothesize that a challenger state in a territorial dispute is more likely to initiate a MID against its adversary when the challenger state can achieve exogenous bargaining gains distinct from the territorial dispute. By linking the territorial dispute with another dispute, the challenger state can use the MID to signal resolve for the other dispute. Thus, challenger states can use a MID in a territorial dispute as bargaining leverage in another dispute. I test the hypothesis by analyzing data of all territorial disputes from 1950-2000.

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