

F-5 International Security: Regional Perspectives

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Strife, Struggle, and Survival: The Deceptions of the New Economic Order and its Promises

for Latin Americans in the Twenty-first Century

ABSTRACT:

The Bush administration's National Security doctrine published in March 2006 outlines four strategic priorities for the Western Hemisphere, "bolstering security, strengthening democratic institutions, promoting prosperity, and investing in people." Despite such laudable goals many Latin Americans remain suspicious, if not hostile, to America's foreign policy objectives. Many Latin Americans argue that security is more elusive than ever, that democratic institutions do not reflect the interest of the people, and that the region is not developing. Critics argue that in spite of the administration's rhetoric that promises collective security, democracy, and goodwill, the Bush project is intent on subordinating the region's needs, desires, and interests to the demands and predilections of the United States. If such arguments have merit what might these American demands and predilections be? What needs, desires, and interests of Latin Americans are being subordinated and, most importantly, why? The purpose of this paper is to explore these questions and claims in light of recent, unfolding events in Latin America. The theoretical framework of this exploration is set within the context of a growing body of literature that suggests that understanding current international complexities—and regional conflicts—requires a broader apprehension of the role that nonpolitical actors and multilateral institutions play in the new global economic order that Latin Americans find themselves, an order with few rules and little if any accountability.

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NATO's New Mission: Collective Security, Collective Defense or Coalition Framework

ABSTRACT:

The debate on the role of international organizations acquired new meanings with the increase in US unilateral action and coalition framework interventions. New questions came forth, namely whether collective defense or collective security are still useful and applicable concepts, or whether the so-called "coalitions of the willing" will be the main elements of the future security framework. The debate was intensified by the emergence of new non-traditional threats like terrorism and failed states. As the most successful military alliance in modern times, NATO presents a valuable tool to empirically study these issues. The organization has dramatically transformed itself in the 1990s and 2000s, with the introduction of a variety of new initiatives. It is still debatable, however, what is the nature of the Alliance today – whether it is a purely collective defense structure, a full-fledged collective security organization, or whether it has diluted into a looser coalition establishment. The empirical study of NATO's latest documents and actions shows that the Alliance is not anymore a pure collective defense organization, and is even in the process of moving further away from it. It is not a collective security organization either, although in the 1990s, some reforms were introduced in this direction. While still embodying, to varying degrees, elements from both, NATO has also developed coalition features. In fact, most of the reforms, introduced in the last decade, facilitate the establishment of coalitions. Evidence from Afghanistan – the biggest NATO mission ever – also supports the findings. Besides contributing to the discussion on NATO's future, the findings of this research project might be also useful within the general debate of international cooperation in the new post-9/11 security environment.

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South Africa's Decision to 'Go Nuclear': Applying Operational Code Analysis to States'

Decisions to Proliferate

Abstract:

While the topic of nuclear proliferation made a resurgence with the end of the Cold War with concerns over the spread of such weapons especially to so-called rogue states, little by way of advancement in treatments and approaches to the question of why states decide to proliferate have occurred. The existing literature on proliferation is largely dominated by two approaches: the realist based security model approach, and, the liberalist based domestic politics/institutional model. Despite the voluminous literature exploring the topic of nuclear proliferation, cognitive approaches have been relatively neglected as compared to system and domestic level approaches. Accordingly, the aim of this paper will be to explore the impact of leader's belief system on states' decisions to pursue nuclear weapons — how does a leader's view of the international system influence their attitudes toward proliferation? Rather than seeking to replace the existing literature pointing to external and internal factors, a goal of this paper will be to devise the operational code of state leaders as another variable which may increase the explanatory and predictive power of these pre-existing approaches. The scope of this paper will focus on the proliferation case of South Africa. The South African case offer fertile ground for examining the ability of operational code to add to the literature reviewing this case which has been written on extensively, but exclusively through the lenses of system and/or domestic level analysis. Through sampling public statements, this paper seeks to develop the operational codes for the respective leaders for South Africa in the period prior to the decision to "go nuclear." Furthermore, through the use of operational code analysis we may attempt to make comparisons of South African leaders as against the "average world" leader.

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Comparing the Rise and Divergent Evolution of Military Regimes in Post-Colonial Pakistan and Burma (Myanmar)

ABSTRACT:

In the nineteenth century, Great Britain established a vast South Asian empire that included Pakistan and Burma (Myanmar). To maintain its rule, the British relied on a large military comprised mostly of indigenously-recruited personnel and junior-level officers. At the same time, this military was subject to the colonial administrative service's control. This civilian control remained until Britain relinquished its rule over South Asia. Nearly a decade after independence however, both Pakistan and Burma experienced military coups that overthrew civilian governments. Since then, both states have seen repeated coups and remain ruled by military regimes today. Yet, the military regimes in Pakistan and Burma have developed differently. Whereas the Pakistani military has periodically returned power to civilian authorities, Burmese military regimes have only been replaced by other military regimes. Furthermore, while Pakistani regimes have tolerated some dissent, the Burmese regimes have been nearly totalitarian. This paper seeks to explain how and why this divergent evolution has occurred despite both states having shared a common military and colonial administration. Blending a comparative and historical approach, the study will focus on how norms of civilian control over the military are transmitted, maintained, and eroded in the context of modern South Asia. As such, this study will demonstrate the nature of the Pakistani and Burmese regimes have diverged due to changes in norms brought by the post-colonial political systems/cultures. Overall, this research is intended to shed light not only on modern regional developments but also further research on civil-military relations.

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Strategic Policy in the Western Balkans: Assessment and New Choices

ABSTRACT:

Since the end of the NATO Kosovan Air Campaign in 1999 and the collapse of the Milosevic regime in 2000, the United States, NATO, and the European Union have been engaged in trying to create a common regional security structure for the Western Balkans. These efforts have not been especially well coordinated

and have met with mixed success. Despite EU mandates, there has been little economic coordination among the new nation states in the region. With respect to military and border security issues, the US, NATO, and the European Union efforts have not been well coordinated or generally successful, particularly with respect to Serbia. Without a change in external security policy in the region, it is unlikely that the region will address security issues in a concerted manner in the future. This paper will assess progress in achieving a common regional security structure in the Western Balkans, and reasons for limited progress to date. In addition, prospects and alternatives for future security engagement in the region will be analyzed and addressed.

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